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Abstract— The Energy Internet (EI)-based vehicle-to-grid 
(V2G) technology facilitates the electric vehicles not only to 
distribute additional electricity into grid systems, but also 
support receiving back from the power grid in the form of 
charging. The secure key establishment is quite significant to 
initiate the bidirectional electricity power delivery into and from 
the system. To effectively implement any EI-based V2G 
communication, the authentication protocol must be free from 
cyber attacks. In this study, we not only explore the drawbacks of 
several smart grid-based authentication protocols but also bring 
forth the limitations of a recently presented EI-based V2G 
scheme by Gope and Sikdar. The examined drawbacks in this 
protocol may disrupt its proper functioning, since it faces de-
synchronization problems while logging into the mobile device 
bearing registration parameters. The scheme is also vulnerable to 
replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. The user is also 
unable to validate session key in the protocol. Considering these 
limitations, we propose a novel and efficient V2G protocol 
framework enabling the vehicles to communicate or recharge at 
desired recharging stations. The results of proposed framework 
are compared with several contemporary schemes, and its 
security features are validated by random oracle model-based 
formal analysis. 
 
Index Terms—Vehicle-to-grid, authentication, smart grid, 
energy internet, attacks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he paradigm of energy internet (EI) seeks to assimilate the 
information and communication technologies (ICT), 
modern cyber systems and the current electrical power 
systems which could aid in establishing next generation smart 
grids tremendously [1]. The concept of EI allows the energy to 
be shared analogous to the information being exchanged on 
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traditional internet. The EI resolves to integrate the element of 
economics, data information, and energy relying on power 
grid-based network, resulting in an open framework to 
exchange the energy and corresponding information. It 
enables to combine various energy sources with smart grid and 
contribute to overall efficiency in energy generation, 
distribution, customer-oriented operations and service 
provisioning. All of these contributing factors rely on secure 
communication among the participating entities. 
    The Vehicle to Grid (V2G) technology allows the 
bidirectional flow of energy between power grid and the 
electric vehicles (EV). The electric energy could be transferred 
from power grid to EV whenever the latter needs to recharge 
its battery, and from EV to power grid in case of extra energy 
produced from EV. Hence, in V2G ecosystem, the vehicles 
also act as the energy asset for the smart grid and this 
bidirectional charging may contribute significantly in 
producing the energy. Owing to V2G technology, a single 
household or an individual EI owner may get into the trade of 
selling and purchasing of energy from one’s electric vehicle, 
without building a formal power generation and distribution 
system. The energy produced under EI-based V2G and other 
renewable energy sources could not only meet high energy 
requirements at critical times, but also averts wastage of 
energy produced from renewable sources by real-time 
injecting of the surplus energy back into the grid. This 
efficiency of renewable energy leads to its wider adoption in 
comparison with conventional power energy systems. 
   Besides the flow of energy, another significant aspect of 
EI-based V2G network is information exchange among 
interacting entities. Recently many protocols have been 
presented for authenticated data flows in energy internet based 
grid systems. The standard that deals with the EI-based 
protocols and architectures is ISO/IEC/IEEE 18880 [2]. This 
standard defines architecture, data storage and application 
services for various protocols. The security loopholes have 
been fixed and features enhanced in the later standards such as 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 18881-3. The V2G network system focus on 
mere vehicle charging, grid based charging stations, and the 
power supplying grid system. The charging stations could be 
simultaneously shared by many users. Different standards of 
grid are used at various levels of charging. For charging 
purpose, IEC 15118 standard is used to establish 
communication between EV and EV charger [3]. Likewise, 
the electric vehicle supply equipment employs Open Charge  
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Point Protocol (OCPP) to communicate with energy 
management systems [4]. The security of EI-based V2G 
systems is of significant concern, since the vehicle might be 
attacked by an attacker affecting not only its operation but also 
risk its privacy. The privacy threat could be exposure of user’s 
identity, location and driving path of vehicle, etc. Due to 
mobility of vehicles, the security procedures are getting hard 
to implement in V2G infrastructure-based environment. We 
can see several studies, recently, to ensure the vigorous 
authenticated key agreements in EI-based V2G systems [1-2]. 
 
A. Related Work 
Many authentication protocols have been presented for 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) with different 
application objectives, recently. [5] presented two elliptic 
curve cryptography (ECC) and identity-based authentication 
protocols. Although, these schemes are resistant to 
impersonation and de-synchronization attacks and reduced 
computational cost for smart-meter’s end, yet these are prone 
to man-in-the-middle attack and false data injection attacks. 
[6] presented a smart grid-oriented protocol relying on both 
symmetric and ECC-based operations. However, [6] was 
found to be prone to false injection attacks [7], and high 
computation cost renders it unfit for smart grid applications. 
[7] designed a protocol embedding symmetric and public-key 
operations. Later, [8] demonstrated that [7] does not provide 
resistance to man in the middle attacks, and proposed another 
data aggregation scheme. Thereafter, [9] showed that [8] 
neither resist against forgery attacks nor protects the privacy 
of user. Later, Tsai et al. presented a key distribution protocol 
for smart grids by combining identity-based signature and 
encryption [10]. Then, [10] remarked that does not ensure 
session key security and privacy of long-term secrets in smart 
meter and presented an efficient scheme [11]. Thereafter, [12] 
notices that the scheme [11] suffers man in the middle attack 
further leading to DoS attack ultimately. In [12], the physical 
protection of smart meter is considered by employing Physical 
Uncloneable Functions (PUFs). Here, other than [4-10], many 
protocols in V2G-based systems can be seen with privacy 
issues [11-15, 20-23]. Many of these schemes employ group-
signatures and sign encryption-based operations. However, 
these are costly implementations and also the location privacy 
concerns for EV users remained unsolved in those schemes. In 
this context, Gope and Sikdar (G & S) presented a lightweight 
EI-based V2G authentication protocol [12], however, after a 
careful observation we examined that some limitations in the 
protocol may disrupt the proper functioning of protocol 
framework. The G & S’s scheme suffers de-synchronization 
problems while logging into the device bearing registration 
parameters. The scheme is also vulnerable to replay attack and 
man-in-the-middle attack, since any adversary may pick a 
legitimate message from the user request on open channel and 
forward to service provider by appending that message with 
the charging station’s previous session’s message. The service 
provider is unable to detect this attack and validates the forged 
message mistakenly, which may lead to serious revenue based 
concerns on the part of service provider. Besides, the user is 
unable to evaluate the legitimacy of session key in that 
protocol if the adversary manipulates public channel and 
injects false information in the message. Considering the 
above flaws, we propose a novel and efficient V2G protocol 
framework enabling the vehicles to communicate or recharge 
at desired service stations in a secure manner.  Besides, the 
results of the proposed framework are compared with several 
contemporary schemes, and the feasibility of our scheme is 
demonstrated under random oracle model-based formal 
analysis. 
B. Our Contribution: 
In this scheme, we present a lightweight and secure model for 
EI-based V2G communication architecture. The subscribers 
may get their vehicles charged on service stations of different 
rates depending on the geographical location. The existing 
schemes for V2G are unable to resist various attacks such as 
impersonation attacks, forgery and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Our scheme ensures resistance from those attacks as well as 
brings efficiency due to employing lightweight primitives. 
C. System Model 
The system model for the EI-based V2G technology 
framework is depicted in Fig. 1, which comprises three main 
set of entities: a number of EV users having a mobile gadget 
with access of internet, a number of recharging stations CSj, 
and a Electricity Service provider (ESP). The ESP comprises 
two components, 1) Power Generation and Distribution 
(PGDC) 2) Data Centre (DC). A user gets registered with its 
electric vehicle from ESP. The ESP stores all of its data in 
data centre. The ESP procures the electric power from 
different vendors and distributes to several charging stations in 
various locations. The charging stations may exist in 
Corporate Class Locality (CCL), residential Society-based 
Class Locality (SCL) or any Public Class Locality (PCL). The 
subscribers may get their vehicles charged from any of the 
charging stations in a location. The charging rates may vary 
from location to location. For instance, the stations at 
corporate locations may charge more than residential society 
locations, and the stations at residential society may charge 
more than those in public places. In this context, the identity 
of location becomes very crucial. In this system, the users 
having EVs get registered with ESP on secure channel. 
Subsequently, these users employ public channels to get 
authenticated on the field from various charging stations. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  System model 




Table I. Symbols with definitions 
Symbols Definition 
Ui/CSj/ESP:  User/ Charging Station/ Electric Service Provider 
IDu, IDc: Identities of user and CSj 
NIDi:  Pseudo identity of user or subscriber 
MIDc:  Masked identity of CSj 
𝜑𝑖  , pwdi Biometric value and password of user 
qi: Shared secret between Ui and ESP 
Kuc: Shared secret between CSj and ESP 
Gen/Rep: Generation /Reproduction function:  
Ȃ: Adversary 
SK:  Session key between Ui and CSj 
LRIu, LRICS Location region identifiers for Ui and CSj 
, ||, h() XOR, Concatenation, A secure one-way hash function 
 
D. Adversary Model 
The subscriber and ESP communicate on a secure channel for 
registration phase, while the same participants utilize public 
channel to authenticate one another for converging on a 
mutually agreed session key. We bring the renowned Dolev-
Yao attack model [13] in consideration while developing the 
proposed model. This model assumes that an attacker is 
capable of intercepting, replaying, and modifying the message 
contents recovered on public channel. The chances of forgery, 
replay and man-in-the middle attacks become even higher on 
account of wireless communication being used in EI-based 
V2G network. The privacy of user becomes more significant 
in EI-based vehicle owners, and the adversary may exploit the 
open channel to intrude into the users’ privacies and 
impersonate on their behalf to get the services. At the same 
time, various charging stations could impersonate one another 
to charge more from the subscribers.  
II. PRELIMINARIES 
This section briefly presents fuzzy extractor function as 
follows. Fuzzy extractor modifies the biometric input data into 
uniform random strings which then serves as a biometric key 
[14]. Using this algorithm, any random length string Li could 
be reformed by merging a generic biometric input (including 
noise) Ji with the helper string Hi. This algorithm needs two 
operations to function properly, i.e. Gen and Rep. The Gen 
operation takes biometric input Ji and generates binary output 
Li ∈ {0, 1}𝑙 and a helper output Hi ∈ {0, 1}∗. The Li string is kept 
secret, while Hi is also stored. To recover Li, the second 
operation Rep is employed to use the factors Ji and Hi. To 
validate the correctness of fuzzy extractor, the function ds (Ji, 
Ji*) <=t and Gen(Ji)→(Li, Hi) is utilized. Then, we get Rep (Ji*, 
Hi) → Li, where ds represents distance function and t as error 
threshold. The Table I shows symbols as used in the scheme. 
III. Review of G & S protocol 
This section presents the working and drawbacks of G & S 
protocol.  
A.   Revisiting G & S’s Protocol 
This section depicts the review of G & S’s authentication 
protocol for EI-based vehicle to grid communication. In this 
protocol, the three entities namely, user Ui having a mobile 
gadget with equipped internet, a charging station CSj, and a 
electricity service provider ESP, interact to validate the Ui’s 
authenticity so that the latter could get the recharging services 
from CSj. The G & S’s protocol [12] contains two phases 1) 
user registration 2) mutual authentication.  
i. User registration phase 
A vehicle user needs to register from ESP for getting the 
recharging services. Its registration procedure is given below: 
1. Initially, the user submits its identity IDu towards ESP as a 
registration request by using a confidential channel.  
2. Next, the ESP records the user’s entry into its database and 
constructs a new pseudo identity NIDi, a secret key qi and also 
a set of shadow identities SID = {sid1, sid2, sid3,….., sidn}, 
which may be used if the participants lose synchronization 
among themselves. Thereafter, ESP submits the message 
{NIDi, qi, SID} towards user by utilizing a confidential channel. 
3. After receiving the message from ESP, the Ui inputs its 
biometric factor 𝜑𝑖, password pwdi and computes 𝛾𝑖= h(𝜑𝑖) 
and 𝜔𝑖=h(𝛾𝑖|| pwdi). After computing 𝜔𝑖, the user stores the 
message {𝜔𝑖, NIDi, qi*, SID} in its mobile gadget to utilize while 
authenticating with the charging station. 
ii. Login and Authentication phase  
To obtain the services of charging station CSj, Ui must 
authenticate CSj. Likewise; CSj also authenticates the user 
with the help of ESP. The steps in mutual authentication phase 
for Ui and CSj are illustrated below: 
1. The user inputs its password pwdi and biometric factor 𝜑𝑖. 
Then, it computes 𝛾𝑖= h(𝜑𝑖) and 𝜔𝑖′=h(𝛾𝑖|| pwdi) and compares 
the equality for 𝜔𝑖′ ?= 𝜔𝑖. If it is not true, the smart card 
terminates the session. Otherwise, computes qi = qih(𝜑𝑖|| 
pwdi). Next, it generates a random number Ru and finds the 
location region identifier LRIu. Then, it computes EL= 
LRIuh(qi||Ru) and B1 = h(NIDi||Ru||qi||EL). Finally, it submits the 
message M1={NIDi, Ru, EL, B1} towards charging station. 
2. Next, CSj generates a random integer Rc and computes B2= 
h(IDc||Rc||Kuc||LRICS), where LRICS represents location region 
identifier for charging station. Then, it submits the message  
M2 = { M1, IDc , Rc , LRICS , B2} towards ESP. 
3. Next, ESP recovers corresponding NIDi from its repository 
and verifies message. Then, it computes IDc=h(qi||NIDi)MIDc 
and verifies B1 and B2. Onwards, it decodes and compares LRIu 
against LRICS. If it is validated, it further constructs and 
generates the novel SK and a pseudo identity NIDinew. 
Thereafter, it further computes NIDinew*=h(NIDi||qi)NIDinew, 
SKu=h(IDu||qi||Ru)SK, SKcs= h(IDc||Kuc||Rc)SK, B3=h(SKcs|| 
Kuc||Rc) and B4=h(IDu||qi||NIDinew*). Finally, it submits the 
message M3={NIDinew*, SKu, B4)||(SKsp, B3)} towards CSj.  
4. The CSj computes and verifies the validity of parameter B3 
and also calculates the session key as SK=h(IDc||Kuc||Rc)SKCS. 
Then it sends M4= {NIDinew*,SKu, B4} to Ui for final verification.  
5. Ui, finally verifies B4 ?=B4 after computing B4. If successful, 
it further computes SK = h(IDu ||qi||Ru)SKu and NIDinew= 
h(NIDi||qi )NIDinew*. This mutually agreed session key is used 
by Ui and CSj to authenticate and get the required services. 
B.   Drawbacks in G & S’s protocol 
The G & S has the following drawbacks: 1) The scheme may 
suffer biometric de-synchronization problem during the login 
process; 2) The attacker may initiate replay attack, and owing 
to this neither user, nor ESP could authenticate the CSj; 3) The 
user is unable to verify the validity of mutually established 




session key; 4) If a single session key is exposed to Ȃ, it might 
lead to server impersonation attacks in future. 
i. Biometric de-synchronization: One of the drawbacks in G 
& S’s scheme is biometric de-synchronization in which the 
captured biometric parameters might vary little bit each time it 
is captured that may result in failure to login attempts 
repeatedly into mobile device by the user. This may occur 
even without Ȃ’s involvement. This is because of the fact, in 
G & S, the captured biometric features are stored without any 
biometric parameters capturing tool such as bio-hashing or 
fuzzy extractor based functions [14]. 
ii. Replay attack: In [12], Ȃ may initiate replay attack which 
may prevent user and ESP to authenticate the involved CSj. 
The attack may be initiated by taking the following steps: 
1. The attacker intercepts the message M1={NIDi, Ru, EL, B1} on 
its way to a particular charging station CSj. Next, it appends 
any intercepted message of CSj issued for other subscriber 
{IDc, Rc, LRICS, B2} with Ui’s message and forwards M2={M1, 
IDc, Rc, LRICS, B2} towards ESP. Now Ȃ may obstruct the 
message completely and forwards a new message; or else it 
may utilize a fast communication channel to forward message 
towards ESP before original message could reach the server. 
2. Upon receiving the message from Ȃ, the ESP verifies all the 
parameters of legitimate user. However, it may not determine 
the Ȃ’s involvement or non-participation of CSj entity in 
forwarding the received message. The ESP constructs 
response message and submits to CSj, which is received by Ȃ. 
The Ȃ, in return, forwards the message to Ui. The message is 
validated by the user and recovers agreed session key. The 
pseudonym is also updated in its repository by Ui. However, 
the legal CSj is ignorant of the created session key by Ui or 
ESP. Although, it does not disturb the overall system, yet it 
makes the participants (user and ESP) erroneously believe that 
the session key is mutually shared by the intended 
participants. The user will be kept in waiting position from the 
CSj for any feedback or response. Similarly, ESP shall be 
expecting from CSj of any revenue credited to its account, 
since ESP had verified CSj’s authenticity to a particular user.  
iii. No session key verification:  In G & S scheme, the user 
does not verify the authenticity of created session key. An 
adversary may inject a fake message using XOR function on 
its way towards user from CSj or ESP. The session key should 
have been included by ESP in the message B4. Thus, Ȃ may 
disrupt the functioning of G & S by manipulating it, which 
renders scheme inapplicable for practical applications. 
iv. Key Compromise Impersonation attack: The G & S claims 
that if both the keys qi and Kuc are exposed to Ȃ, then only, the 
adversary may be able to impersonate as a service provider. 
However, we observe that if a single shared user secret qi is 
revealed by mistake to the Ȃ, then it may impersonate as a 
service provider by taking the following steps: 
1. The Ȃ could guess the identity IDu by using the intercepted 
public parameter Ru from intercepted SKu. 
2. Now, Ȃ having qi, Ru and IDu may impersonate as a service 
provider by constructing M4= {NIDinew*, SKu, B4} and submitting 
to user, where Ru is intercepted from Ui’s authentication 
request on real time basis. Here, the factors NIDinew and B4 may 
be constructed by Ȃ having qi, by computing NIDinew*= 
h(NIDi||qi)NIDinew and B4=h(IDu||qi|| NIDinew*), where NIDinew is 
randomly selected pseudonym number. Now, Ȃ may initiate a 
successful key compromise impersonation attack against user 
originating the authentication request. 
III.   Proposed Model 
This section presents an enhanced authentication protocol for 
EI-based vehicle to grid communication. Our scheme assumes 
the similar system architecture as G & S has illustrated in its 
protocol. In this system model, the three entities namely, user 
Ui with mobile device, a charging station CSj, and a utility 
service provider ESP, cooperate one another to enable the 
mutual authenticity between Ui and CSj. In this manner, the 
user may qualify for the stipulated recharging services. Our 
scheme comprises two phases; user registration andmutual 
authentication phase.  
A.   User registration phase:  
A vehicle user needs to register itself from ESP for getting the 
recharging services. The registration steps are given below: 
1. Initially, the user submits its identity IDu towards ESP as a 
registration request by using a confidential channel.  
2. Next, ESP records the user’s entry into its database and 
constructs a new pseudo identity NIDi, a secret key qi and also 
a set of shadow identities SID = {sid1, sid2, sid3,….., sidn}, 
which may be used if the participants lose the synchronization 
among themselves. Thereafter, the ESP submits {NIDi, qi, 
SID} towards user by utilizing a confidential channel. 
3. After receiving the message from ESP, the Ui inputs its 
biometric factor 𝜑𝑖  and password pwdi. Then it computes 
Gen(𝜑𝑖)→(Ri, Pi) and stores Pi into the mobile gadget. Next, the 
gadget computes 𝛾𝑖=h(Ri) and 𝜔𝑖=h(𝛾𝑖||pwdi). After computing 
𝜔𝑖 the Ui stores {𝜔𝑖, Pi, NIDi, qi*,SID} in its mobile gadget to 
enable mutual authentication between Ui and CSj/ESP. 
B.   Login and Authentication phase  
To obtain the services of CSj, Ui must authenticate CSj, while 
CSj must authenticate Ui with the help of ESP. The steps in 
mutual authentication for Ui and CSj are given below: 
1. Ui inputs its password pwdi and biometric factor 𝜑𝑖*.Then, 
it computes Rep (𝜑𝑖*, Pi) →Ri. Next, it computes 𝛾𝑖= h(Ri) 
and 𝜔𝑖′=h(𝛾𝑖|| pwdi) and compares the equality for 𝜔𝑖′ ?=  𝜔𝑖. 
If it is not true, the mobile gadget terminates the session. 
Otherwise, computes qi=qih(𝜑𝑖||pwdi). Next, it generates a 
random number Ru and finds location region identifier LRIu. 
Then, it computes masked identity as MIDc=h(qi||NIDi)IDc, 
EL= LRIuh(qi||Ru) and B1=h(IDc||NIDi||Ru||qi||EL). Finally, it 
submits the message M1={ NIDi, MIDc, Ru, EL, B1} towards CSj. 
2. Next, CSj generates a random integer Rc and computes 
B2=h(B1||IDc||Rc||Kuc||LRICS), where LRICS represents the location 
region identifier for charging station and Tc is timestamp. 
Then, it submits M2 = {M1, Rc ,Tc, LRICS , B2} towards ESP. 
3. The ESP, upon receiving it, recovers the NIDi and qi from its 
repository and computes IDc=h(qi||NIDi)MIDc. It then verifies 
parameters Tc, B1 and B2 and location region identities for LRIu 
against LRICS. If it is verified, it further constructs and creates a 
new SKc (Current session key) and a pseudo identity NIDinew. 
Next, it computes NIDinew*=h(NIDi||qi)NIDinew, SKu=h(IDu||IDc|| 
SKp||qi||Ru)SKc, SKcs=h(IDc|| Kuc||Rc)SK, B3=h(SKcs||Kuc||Rc) and 
B4=h(IDu||SKp||SKc||qi|| NIDinew*), where SKp denotes past session 
key. Then, it submits M3={(NIDinew*, SKu, B4)||(SKsp, B3)} to CSj.  
 





Fig. 2. Proposed model 
 
4. The CSj verifies the validity of B3 and computes session key 
as SK=h(IDc||Kuc||Rc)SKCS and forwards M4={NIDinew*, SKu, B4} 
to user for final verification as shown in Fig. 2. 
5. The user verifies the equation B4 ?=B4 after computing B4. If 
true, it further computes SKc=h(IDu||IDc||SKp||qi||Ru)SKu and 
NIDinew=h(NIDi||qi)NIDinew*. The agreed session key is used by 
Ui and CSj to authenticate and get the required services. 
C.   Password revision 
In proposed scheme, the password may be revised off and on 
by the subscriber for safety reasons, without consulting the 
administrator or server by adopting the following procedure:  
1. Initially, Ui inputs its password pwdi and biometric factor 
𝜑𝑖*. Then, it computes Rep(𝜑𝑖*,Pi)→Ri. Further, it calculates 
𝛾𝑖= h(Ri) and 𝜔𝑖′=h(𝛾𝑖|| pwdi) and compares the equality for 𝜔𝑖′  
?=  𝜔𝑖. If it does not match, the session is terminated.  
2. Otherwise, the mobile device computes qi = qih(𝜑𝑖|| pwdi) 
and proceeds for inputting new password from subscriber as 
pwdinew. The mobile device computes 𝜔𝑖 ′′=h(𝛾𝑖|| pwdi
new) and qi′ 
=qih(𝜑𝑖||pwdi
new). Lastly, it replaces 𝜔𝑖 with 𝜔𝑖 ′′ and qi with 
qi′ in the mobile device to finalize the password modification. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
This section presents the informal security discussion, 
demonstrates formal security analysis and security verification 
using Proverif tool. 
A.  Informal security analysis  
The informal security discussion of our scheme is as under:  
i. Impersonation or forgery attack: The proposed scheme is 
immune to impersonation attack, since no Ȃ may impersonate 
as either user, or CSj or ESP. The user and CSj entities, both 
share secrets qi and Kuc with ESP. Until, these shared secrets 
are exposed to the Ȃ, the latter could not launch any kind of 
impersonation attack. If Ȃ attempts to replay or modify 
parameters to impersonate as a user, this attempt is unmasked 
at ESP’s end while verifying parameters NIDi, B1, B2 and 
location identifiers i.e. LRIu against LRICS. Similarly, if Ȃ 
impersonates as ESP, this unauthorized attempt is unmasked 
upon the verification of B4 = h(IDu || SKc || SKp ||qi || NIDinew*). 
ii. Session key verification: The user in proposed scheme 
verifies mutually established session key between user and 
CSj with the help of ESP. Earlier, in G & S, the user could not 
validate the authenticity of fake session key due to the 
malicious treatment of messages on the way to the user by Ȃ. 
The verification of parameters by comparing B4' ?=B4 ensures 
the authenticity of recovered session key by the user, while 
B4is computed by embedding various factors including current 
session key SKc, where  B4 = h(IDu || SKc || SKp ||qi || NIDinew*). 
iii. Known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy: In 
proposed scheme, if the current session key is revealed to Ȃ, 
the latter may not compute previous session keys as it does not 
have the shared long-term secret keys which are necessary to 
recover the past session keys from SKu. Similarly, in our 
scheme if the long term user secret key qi is revealed to Ȃ, the 
latter might not be able to compute current session key SKc, 
since it has no access to previous session key SKp. Hence, our 
scheme adequately provides known-key and forward secrecy. 
iv. Physical device exposure attack: In this scheme we 
assume that the devices are tamper proof and are capable of 
implementing Physical Uncloneable Functions (PUFs), which 
suggests that the devices could hamper any physical exposure 
to the Ȃ for any leakage of parameters. Any malicious attempt 
on the device shall be rendered useless due to the embedded 
hardware design and employed PUFs implementation.   
v. Key Compromise Impersonation attack: In G & S scheme, 
Ȃ could access all previous session keys if the shared secret qi 
is mistakenly exposed. However, in our scheme if qi is 
exposed to Ȃ by mistake, Ȃ may not recover current session 
key SKc, as it has no access to previous session key SKp. The 
shared secret between CSj and ESP is assumed to be 
protected; however, the subscriber may lose its secret key by 
accident, as illustrated in the adversary model.  
vi. Resist unjustified failures of login attempts: The failure 
of login attempts was the limitation in G & S due to the 
mismatch between stored and captured parameters. This 
happens when the biometric input is directly applied to 
compute any parameter in a function. The flaw could be 
remedied by employing the fuzzy extractor algorithms on 
captured biometric inputs. In our scheme, we employed fuzzy 
extractor algorithm on the captured biometric to bring the 
uniformity in the captured and stored biometric parameters so 
it may resist unjustified failures to login attempts. 
vii. Resist DoS attack: The denial of service (DoS) attack is 
not possible in our scheme since the ESP verifies the factors 
NIDi, B1, and B2 before accessing the repository. If the NIDi, 
B1 and B2 are authenticated using the current time stamp, only 
then the database will be accessed. Hence, it may resist DoS 
attack.  
B.   Formal Security Analysis Using ROM 
In this section, we demonstrate the sound security features 
proposed model by formal security analysis and proofs. 
i.  Definitions and assumptions 




Bellare and Rogaway came forward with a formal security 
proof for two-party symmetric authentication protocol [15]. 
Since, the charging station CSj used to forward the message of 
subscriber, hence the real authentication is between the ESP 
and subscriber, and it is assumed that the communication 
between CSj and ESP is secure. In this scenario, CSj and ESP 
might be deemed as a single member for analyzing formally.  
1. Complexity assumptions: Since, the proposed model’s 
security depends largely on one-way hash digest function or 
alternatively a pseudorandom function [16], it is necessary to 
define few security terms for pseudorandom functions and the 
game scenario as utilized in the forthcoming security proof. 
Definition 1: We assume r as a polynomial time function and 
AdvJ= |Pr[Jr =1]- Pr[Jr' =1]| be the advantage of an algorithm J, 
if managed by some probabilistic polynomial time Ȃ , while Ȃ 
could distinguish r function from r' function. Here, r acts as a 
(g, qr, ε)-secure pseudorandom function only if there exists no 
algorithm J distinguishing r from r' having AdvJ ≥ ε, that may 
launch at most qr oracle queries towards r or any truly random 
function r' and running at most g times this game. 
Initialization: While interacting with Ȃ, a challenger Ƈ 
chooses some randomly selected bit b 𝜖 {0, 1} for gauging 
function rb, where r0 represents a pseudo-random function and 
r1 represents a perfect random function. 
Training phase: Ȃ may issue qr queries, z1, …,zqr towards Ƈ, 
where zi 𝜖 {0, 1}* represent the random length-based binary 
strings. The Ƈ answers to those queries through submitting 
rb(zi) toward Ȃ such that i 𝜖 (1≤ 𝑖 ≤qr), where rb(zi) 𝜖{0, 1}ℓand 
ℓ represents the length of the string with positive integer. 
Guess: The Ȃ produces b* 𝜖 {0, 1} output by guessing b, and 
wins the game on matching the equality for b* and b. The Ȃ’s 
advantage of winning game is as Advr0, A = |Pr[b=b']- 0.5|. 
2) Security Model and Symbols:  
Protocol participants: The oracle ∏  𝑠X,Y represents Ȃ’s role in 
X’s interaction with Y for session s, and ∏  𝑡Y,X as Ȃ’s role for 
Y’s interaction with X for session t, where X, Y𝜖 D, s, t 𝜖 N, 
D denotes players’ identities, and N is set of positive integers. 
Protocols: Our scheme used three entities for establishing the 
agreed session key between subscriber and service provider. 
However, this protocol could be condensed as de-factor two 
party protocol. Hence, we describe the authentication protocol 
for two interacting members in the following way: 
Definition 2: We can formally define a two party 
authenticated key agreement P by an efficient and computable 
function ∏    , using the under-mentioned inputs: 
e: denotes the length of parameter as employed in the scheme. 
X: denotes the identity of protocol initiator, where X 𝜖 D. 
Y: denotes identity of other participant in the protocol, where Y 𝜖 D. 
f: denotes the secret parameter, where f 𝜖 {0, 1}*. 
𝜕: represents up-to-date exchanged messages in the protocol. 
𝜏: the randomly flipped coins for protocol initiator, while 𝜏𝜖{0, 1}+. 
The output of ∏(e, X, Y, f, 𝜕, 𝜏)=(c, 𝜎, 𝛽) can be defined as under: 
c: It depicts message that is scheduled to be forwarded next, where 
c𝜖{0, 1}∪{*}, here * indicates blank message sent by initiator. 
𝜎: It shows the “accept” (Ã) or “reject” (Ɽ) decision, or even “no 
decision” (*) at all, i.e., 𝜎𝜖 {Ã, Ɽ, *}. 
𝛽: It represents the private output, i.e. 𝛽𝜖 {0, 1}*∪ {*}, and {*} 
shows that the protocol initiator have no private output. 
3) Adversary Model: The Ȃ, being a probabilistic polynomial-
time Turing machine for the protocol run, might eavesdrop, 
modify the messages, and fully control the public channel. 
This activity could be represented by the understated queries: 
Execute (∏  𝑠X,Y ,∏  
𝑡
Y,X ): The execute query simulates all sort of 
passive attacks, while a passive attacker may intercept the 
communication among ∏  𝑠X,Y and ∏  
𝑡
Y,X for a protocol session. 
Send (∏  𝑠X,Y , 𝑚): The send query simulates active attacks, in which 
an attacker could submit the message m towards and get the response 
in accordance with the contributed protocol. 
Reveal (∏  𝑠X,Y ): The reveal key simulates the revelation of past 
session key/s regarding any session. 
Corrupt (∏  𝑠X,Y ): The simulation of corrupt key reveals long term high 
entropy secrets, while this query simulates the attacks passively. 
Test (∏  𝑠X,Y ): Upon acceptance and construction of agreed session 
key by ∏  𝑠X,Y , Ȃ may initiate the Test query and could attempt 
distinguishing a legal session key from any randomly selected string. 
4) Security Definitions: Now we define some definitions for a 
matching conversation below: 
Definition 3:We define a protocol session for entity X as (X, 
Y, s, role) where Y being identity for X’s co-partner, s being 
identifier of session, and role is either initiator or responder. 
The protocol having two sessions between X and Y is of form 
(X, Y, s, initiator) and (X, Y, t, responder), respectively, and 
are called matching conversation sessions engaging X and Y 
only if session identifiers are same, while the initiator and 
response entities being X and Y. If P contains more than two 
sessions while every session pair be a matching conversation, 
then P is termed as protocol with matching conversations. 
  The mutual authentication can be defined on the basis of 
matching conversation as follows: A protocol P complies with 
mutual authentication if for Ȃ: 1) the matching conversation 
will be deemed as acceptance and 2) acceptance will be 
regarded as matching conversation. The first condition 
suggests that if in P’s session of two parties there is matching 
conversation, both intended parties are said to accept each 
other. According to second condition, if each entity accepts 
authenticated session with another entity, then the chances of 
matching conversation would be negligible. Theoretically, we 
define mutual authentication (MuA) as given below: 
Definition 4: A protocol satisfies MuA-secure feature only if: 
1. There is matching conversation for ∏  𝑠X,Y and ∏  
𝑡
Y,X , that is, 
the latter oracles are said to accept each other. 
2. The NoMatchingA(k) event occurs and there exist i, j, X, 
and Y such that ∏  𝑖X,Y  is accepted, however there is no other 
matching conversation-based ∏  
𝑗
Y,X , where the chances of 
occurring NoMatchingA(k) event is negligible, here k is 
security parameter. This event may be referred as 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠 𝑃
𝑀𝑢𝐴(Ȃ). 
This indicates the probability of success about Ȃ’s launching 
impersonation attack towards any one of the two entities in P. 
Authentication Key Agreement (AKA) Security: To execute 
MuA-secure compliant protocol P, the attacker may interact 
with two fresh oracles such as ∏  𝑠X,Y  and ∏  
𝑡
Y,X . After 
execution, Ȃ issues Test query to any one of those two oracles. 
Consequently, either the valid session key or some random 
string will be sent to Ȃ corresponding to random bit b. In the 
end, Ȃ shall output a bit b* and ends the game. Now, the 
AKA-advantage 𝐴𝑑𝑣 𝑃
𝐴𝐾𝐴(Ȃ) can be described as |Pr[b*=b]- 0.5|. 
We can lay down the AKA-security theoretically as: 




Definition 5: The protocol is deemed to AKA-secure only if it 
complies with the understated conditions: 
1. Ȃ may engage in the authentication protocol’s execution 
with oracles, i.e., ∏  𝑠X,Y  and ∏  
𝑡
Y,X . Both of these oracles may 
accept and establish an agreed session key between them. 
2. The protocol complies with MuA-secure property 
3. The advantage 𝐴𝑑𝑣 𝑃
𝐴𝐾𝐴(Ȃ) is quite negligible for any of the 
probabilistic polynomial time Ȃ. 
ii. Formal Analysis of the proposed protocol 
In the formal analysis, it is demonstrated that the contributed 
scheme as based on hash function-oriented pseudorandom 
functions, is provably secure of attacks.  
Lemma 1: If we assume a function h as a secure 
pseudorandom function (m0, u0, 𝜗0) having negligible 𝜗0, the 
proposed protocol stands MuA-secure. 
Proof.  For proving the lemma 1, it is assumed there is a 
polynomial time attacker who is capable of breaking MuA-
security of the contributed scheme P with high probability 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠 𝑃
𝑀𝑢𝐴(Ȃ). For this, a polynomial-time algorithm Ɲ is 
constructed with considerable advantage, and this proves the 
contradiction. Besides, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠 𝑃
𝑀𝑢𝐴(Ȃ) = Pr [ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑈𝑖 ] + Pr [ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑆 ] 
– Pr [ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑈𝑖,  𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑆 ]  ≤ Pr [ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑈𝑖 ] + Pr [ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑆 ] , where the 
events 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑈𝑖and 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑆 represent the success probabilities of 
legitimate User and Server’s impersonation attempts by the Ȃ. 
Hence, the proof can be divided in two cases, one for server’s 
impersonation and other as Ui’s impersonation. 
Case 1 (Server S’s impersonation): We suppose that Ȃ may 
impersonate as S with probability ¢. If the Ȃ wants to get 
authenticated from Ui successfully by employing ∏  𝑠Ui,S  
controlled by the algorithm Ɲ, Ȃ must accurately submit B4 = 
h(IDu || SKc || SKp ||qi || NIDinew*). In the game ahead, Ɲ will take 
advantage of capable Ȃ for breaking the assumption of 
pseudorandom function with probability ¢≤4𝜗0+2
-v, where v is 
a security factor. Ɲ plays game with Ƈ as given below: 
Initialization: We assume the long term secret key as qi which 
is ℒ bit in length. The Ƈ chooses any random bit Ƅ'𝜖{0, 1}and 
constructs a secure hash function hb' where h0=hqi be a pseudo-
random function and h1 a random function. If Ɲ models the 
game by using h1 for interaction with Ȃ, we term the game 
experiment as random experiment. Alternatively, in case the Ɲ 
utilizes h0 for modeling the game, it will be termed as a real 
experiment. The objective lies with guessing the equality for 
hb' = h0 or hb' = h1 i.e guessing the value for Ƅ' as 0 or 1.  
Training: The Ɲ models ∏  𝑠Ui,S and ∏  
𝑠
Ui,S for interaction with Ȃ 
and in return responds to the under-mentioned queries: 
 Execute (∏  𝑠Ui,S ,∏  
𝑡
Ui,GN ): Ɲ employs as hb' as provided by Ƈ for hqi 
in protocol P. Ɲ again constructs qh randomly and NIDinew*and 
calculates NIDinew*=h(NIDi||qi)NIDinew, SKu=h(IDu||IDc||SKp||qi|| 
Ru)SKc , and B4 = h(IDu || SKc || SKp ||qi || NIDinew*). Thereafter, Ɲ 
models ∏  𝑠Ui,S  and ∏  
𝑡
S,Ui  using hb', NIDi
new*, SKu and B4.  
 Send (∏  𝑠Ui,S ,𝑚): The oracle ∏  
𝑠
Ui,S  submits request m={NIDi, Ru, 
B1} to ∏  𝑡S,Ui in P. The latter verifies B1 after querying hb' and checks 
NIDi in repository and validates B1 after querying hb'. 
 Send (∏  𝑡S,Ui ,𝑚): After getting m={NIDi, Ru, B1},∏  
𝑡
S,Ui computes 
NIDinew*=h(NIDi||qi)NIDinew, khGN=h(IDu||IDc||SKp||qi||Ru)SKc and 
B4=h(SKu||qi||NIDinew*). Then it submits m={NIDinew*, SKu, B4} to Ȃ. 
Challenge: Ȃ sends the Send (∏  𝑠Ui,S , 𝑚) to initiate P. Then, the 
oracle ∏  𝑠Ui,S  submits m={NIDi, Ru, B1} to Ȃ. Then, Ȃ computes 
B4 with probability Pr [𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑆] = ¢. Next, Ȃ queries Send (∏  
𝑡
S,Ui , 
{NIDinew*, SKu, B4}). Upon receiving the query, Ɲ issues the 
query z*=h(SKu||qi) to hb' and receives B4*=h(SKu||qi|| NIDinew*). 
Guess: Ultimately, the Ɲ outputs and makes a guess of the bit 
Ƅ''𝜖{0, 1}. If the equality B4* = B4 holds, Ɲ returns output 0, on 
the other hand, Ɲ produces any random bit from the set {0, 1}. 
   The probability analysis regarding Ɲ for successfully 
distinguishing between hb' may be divided into two parts: one 
with random experiment (i.e. Ƅ''=1) and the other with real 
experiment as (i.e. Ƅ''=0). For the real experiment case, the Ȃ 
may submit the accurate information for winning the game 
with chances ¢, and the Ɲ may output as Ƅ''=0 having ¢ 
probability. Otherwise, if Ȃ submits the faulty information, the 
Ɲ may randomly guess bit Ƅ'', and Ɲ will produce (Ƅ'' = 0) with 
probability (1− ¢) 2⁄ . For random experiment, Ȃ may submit 
accurate information by guessing at random, and its 
probability of guessing is 2−𝑒. Therefore, if b'=1, the Ɲ 
produces Ƅ''=1 with probability (1 − 2−𝑒)/2. By summing up 
both probabilities (i.e. b''=1 and b''=0), we get to the result 
{1/2 + ¢ /4 − 2−(𝑒+2)}. Hence, according to this accumulation 
result it is proved the probability ¢ cannot exceed 4𝜗0 + 2
−𝑒.  
Case 2 (Ui’s impersonation): Assume that Ȃ may 
impersonate as a user with chance ¢'. If Ȃ wants to get 
accepted by∏  𝑡S,Ui , then Ȃ needs to submit accurate data. 
Hence, Ɲ induces a similar game with Ƈ as it employs above. 
Initialization: To initialize, the challenger chooses a hash 
digest function hb, b having the value set {0, 1} to respond the 
queries from Ɲ, where h0=hqi be a pseudorandom function 
while h1 be the random function. 
Training: Ɲ initially chooses Ru and NIDi in P, and models 
∏  𝑠Ui,S  and ∏  
𝑡
S,Ui  by responding to Execute (∏  
𝑠
Ui,S ,∏  
𝑡
S,Ui ) and 
Send(∏  𝑠Ui,S ,𝑚) queries. 
Guess: Ɲ produces an output by guessing b'with set of values 
{0, 1} corresponding to NIDi and B1. If these parameters are 
validated, the Ɲ produces the output 0, specifying hb=hqi; or 
else it produces a random bit from the set {0, 1}.  
The probability of Ȃ’s submitting the accurate parameters NIDi 
and B1 is ¢' for the real experiment, while for the random 
experiment it is 2−𝑒. After combining probabilities for both 
experiments, we get {1/2 + ¢' /4 − 2−(𝑒+2)}. Hence, according 
to this accumulation the probability ¢' is at most 4𝜗0 + 2
−𝑒. 
After summing up the two cases (¢' + ¢), we have 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠 𝑃
𝑀𝑢𝐴(A) ≤Pr [ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑈𝑖 ] + Pr [ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑆 ]   (1)  
                       ≤ 8𝜗0 + 2
−(𝑒−1)                       (2) 
The above equation suggests non-negligibility of𝜗0, 
contracting the above lemma about 𝜗0′s negligibility. 
Therefore, the proposed protocol is MuA-secure. 
Lemma 2: If we assume a function h as a secure 
pseudorandom function (m0, u0, 𝜗0) having negligible 𝜗0, the 
proposed protocol stands AKA-secure. 
Proof. We assume an Ȃ that is capable of breaking AKA-
security of P with considerable advantage 𝐴𝑑𝑣 𝑃
𝐴𝐾𝐴(Ȃ)=𝜗. 
Then, a simulator Ɲ is constructed for breaking the assumption 
of pseudorandom function [17]. The Ɲ, according to definition 
3, plays the game with Ƈ as given below: 





Fig. 3. Simulation results 
Initialization: To initialize, Ƈ chooses a random bit from the 
given set {0, 1} and constructs a secure hash-digest function 
to respond to the queries from Ɲ, where h0=hqi be the 
pseudorandom function, while h1 is a random function. 
Training: The Ɲ chooses the nonce Rg and NIDi in the protocol, 
and models ∏  𝑠Ui,S  and ∏  
𝑡
S,Ui  by responding the queries, 
Execute(∏  𝑠GN,S ,∏  
𝑡
S,GN ) and Send(∏  
𝑠
Ui,S ,𝑚), respectively.  
 Test (∏  𝑠Ui,S ): Using this query, if qh is constructed, Ɲ selects at 
random v ∈{0, 1}, then it responds by returning legal session key qh 
in case v = 0, or any random string if v =1. Or else, Ɲ returns φ, 
indicating null string or emptiness. 
 Test(∏  𝑡R,T ): Its modeling is also similar to above query. 
Challenge: The Ȃ submits the Test query toward Ɲ after 
having queried the oracle Execute (∏  𝑠GN,S ,∏  
𝑡
S,GN ). 
Guess: Upon having queried 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 (∏  𝑠Ui,S ) or  𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 (∏  
𝑡
S,Ui ), the 
Ȃ outputs a bit b as 0, if it takes the responded message as 
valid session key, or else it outputs b as 1. Finally, Ɲ produces 
the b' as 0 if b'=b, or else it will return the output as b'=1. 
   The probability analysis for b'=b is alike the analysis 
performed in Lemma 1. The Ȃ could win this game if it 
guesses the equality for b'=b having the real experiment-based 
probability as (𝜗 + 1/2), i.e. b=0. The Ȃ can only guess under 
random experiment whether b'=b having probability of 0.5, i.e. 
b=1. In case, it effectively makes a guess for b'=b, the Ɲ 
produces the output b'=1. Hence, the probability for {b'=b and 
b=0} is calculated as (𝜗(1/2) + 1/4), while for {b'=b and b=1} 
it is ¼. After accumulating both probabilities for real and 
random experiments, we get (𝜗 + 1)/2. While, the probability 
for 𝜗0 amounts to at least 𝜗/2, which is non-negligible and 
bears a contradiction. Therefore, the advantage 𝐴𝑑𝑣 𝑃
𝐴𝐾𝐴(Ȃ)is 
quite negligible for any polynomial time attacker, and in this 
context our protocol beholds AKA-Secure. 
C.   Security Verification Using Proverif 
The Proverif automated tool [18] is employed to verify the 
demonstrated protocol’s security features including mutual 
authentication and session key confidentiality. In this section, 
we develop the corresponding modules to verify the security 
properties of proposed scheme using Proverif automation tool. 
The Proverif employs widely accepted laws of π calculus 
which facilitate many significant cryptographic operations 
including digital signatures, symmetric or asymmetric 
encryption/decryption, and hash-digest related operations. 
    To perform the simulation, we modeled two events for 
executing the code for Ui and ESP as these are the entities 
mutually authenticating each other, while CSj performs the 
forwarding function in general. The event beginUi (bitstring) 
and event endUi (bitstring) are used by Ui to authenticate ESP. 
 
Table II: Functionality Comparison 
 [6] [7] [5] [10] [8] [12] [11] Ours 
F1 × × ✓ ✓ × ✓ ✓ ✓ 
F2 × × ✓ × ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
F3 × × × ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
F4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × ✓ ✓ 
F5 × × × ✓ × ✓ ✓ ✓ 
F6 × × ✓ × × ✓ ✓ ✓ 
F7 × × ✓ ✓ × × ✓ ✓ 
F8 × × × × × ✓ × ✓ 
F9 × × × × × ✓ × ✓ 
F1: Anonymity, F2: Mutual Authentication, F3: Resist Man in the middle Attack, F4: Resist unjustified 
failures of login attempts, F5: Supports forward secrecy, F6: Resist impersonation attack, F7: Supports 
Session key security, F8: Resist Denial of service attack, F9: Biometric security (3-factor authentication) 
Similarly, the event beginESP (bitstring) and event 
endESP(bitstring) are employed by ESP to authenticate Ui. 
We compute the results of queries and the order of the two 
pair of events remained stable. The results in Fig. 3 depict that 
our scheme achieves mutual authentication and session key 
secrecy since the session key is robust against attackers. 
VI.    PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we examine the performance of proposed 
scheme with other contemporary authentication schemes for 
smart grids. Table I depicts the comparative analysis of 
features and performance efficiency between our scheme and 
other protocols, which manifests that the schemes [5-8, 10-12] 
are unable to ensure the requisite security properties of an 
authentication protocol in general. We focused a few crucial 
security properties such as session key security, man-in-the-
middle attack, DoS and forgery attack, etc. while designing 
the proposed V2G authentication scheme [21-24]. The scheme 
[12] affords many security properties; nonetheless, it does not 
ensure resistance to DoS attacks. Comparatively, our scheme 
warrants this significant security feature as depicted in Table 
II. In our scheme, the early decision on the part of ESP against 
a fake authentication request ensures immunity from DoS 
attack. 
      Next, we compute the computational cost of cryptographic 
operations for proposed and other schemes [5-8, 10-12] as 
given in Table III using JPBC [19, 20] and JCE library [21]. 
These operations are implemented on a mobile device 
(Smartphone Lenovo Zuk Z1 with Quad-core 2.5 Ghz 
processor having 4GB RAM and Android Operating System 
V5.1.2), and a personal computer (Virtual machine with HP 
E8300 Core i5 and 2.93 Ghz processor with 4GB RAM using 
Ubuntu 16.11 OS). The Table III depicts the communication 
and computational costs for proposed and compared schemes. 
It is evident that the performance of our protocol is better in 
terms of computational and communication delay. There are 
specifically some standards for smart grid V2G such as OCPP 
and IEC 15118 protocol, and upon considering these standards 
we find that the schemes [5-7] adopt costly ECDSA 
cryptography-based signatures and suffer security weaknesses 
that render those schemes difficult to fit in V2G applications. 
Such schemes also involve in exposing useful information 
such as subscriber’s name, identification number of vehicle, 
location of charging, and other related information affecting 
the privacy of customer. In this scenario, our proposed scheme 
finds an effective blend with smart gird standard protocols 
such as OCPP and IEC 15118 for being lightweight, efficient  




Table III. Computational cost 
 User (ms) Server (ms) 
TBP 13.662 7.318 
TECM 10.235 5.387 
TExp 8.341 3.362 
TM 5.012 2.002 
TH 0.019 0.012 
TSYM 0.063 0.048 
TBio_Rep 0.015 - 
TCertG 69.326 - 
TCertV - 21.257 
Table IV. Operations cost of communication 
Primitive operations Comm. cost (bits) 
Bilinear Pairing 320 bits 
Elliptic Curve  Point 320 bits 
User/CSj identity 60 bits 
Hash function 160 bits 
Random number 160 bits 
Time Stamp 32 bits 
Digital signature 1024 bits 
Symmetric encryption 256 bits 
Table V. Comparison of Computational and communication cost 








[7] 2TECM+Tm+TCertG+Tsym+Th≈94.89 3TECM+Tm+TCertV 
+Tsym+3Th 39.496 
4836  
[5] 2TECM+Tm+TCertG+3Th≈94.868 3TECM+Tm+TCertV 
+4Th ≈39.468 
2784  
[10] 4TECM+Texp+ 5Th≈49.376 3TECM+Texp+ 5Th+ 
2Tb ≈34.219 
8190  
[8] Tsym+4Th≈0.139 Tsym+4Th≈0.096 3922  
[12] 6Th≈0.114 8Th≈0.096 2144  
[11] 3TECM+Texp+ 6Th≈39.16 2TECM+Texp+ 6Th+ 
2Tb ≈28.844 
3466  
[Ours] 7Th+TBio_Rep≈0.148 9Th≈0.108 2176 
 
and secure protocol.  
    To accommodate the current infrastructure of limited 
stations for vehicle battery charging, the scalability in the 
protocol has been considered. In UK, the fuel stations with the 
largest network are Tesco with 1562 gas stations (operated 
under supermarket chain), BP with 1228 gas stations, and 
lastly the Shell and Esso gas stations, both with more than 
1000 number of stations. For EVs the prevailing capacity of 
battery could be categorized as low charging flow rates with 
3KW to 6KW and high charging flow rates up to 150KW. We 
employed GM Spark, Tesla S 85, and Ford focus EV models 
with battery capacities of 21KWh, 90KWh and 23KWh, 
respectively. If we consider any instant charging station 
having the energy flow rate with 50KWh, then the drained tank 
to full charging for such vehicles may take 25 min, 1.8 hours, 
and 28 min, respectively. Similarly, the high flow rate-based 
charger (150KW) takes 36 minutes to charge Tesla S 85 
battery. If we assume that the average number of charging 
points in a charging station is 15, then 15 cars may get charged 
simultaneously in a CS. This may generate 15 authentication 
requests every hour from a charging station towards server. 
Referring to Table V, the communicational cost of our scheme 
is 2144 bits (268 bytes) excluding TCP/IP and Ethernet 
overhead. Upon adding this overhead of 64 bytes for each 
message, the total cost of authentication request including 4 
messages, becomes 508 bytes. If verification time of 
authentication request at ESP is 0.0009s then for 1562 stations 
of Tesco, the total computation delay on CPU per hour for 
verifying those requests is calculated as 22 sec (1562×15×
0.0009). The bandwidth needed for communicating those 
requests is computed as (508×1562×15) ≈(26.5Kbps). We used 
symbols i.e. TECM for ECC-based point multiplication, Tm for 
modular multiplication, TCertG for certificate generation, Th for 
hash digest, Texp for exponential operation and Tsym for 
symmetric encryption, to calculate communication delay as 
shown in Table IV. Our scheme takes quite less 
communication cost of 2176 bits as compared to other related 
schemes which take from 2590 to 8190 bits to communicate for 
authentication. Although, communication cost for [12] is less 
than our scheme as 2144, it is prone to many security 
problems. These research findings warrant to a large extent 
that our protocol complies with the claimed security features 
having low computational and communicational costs which 
render it quite suitable for EI-based V2G authentication 
models. 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
To effectively initiate the power transfer among entities in an 
energy internet-based vehicle-to-grid system, a secure data 
exchange is very indispensable. For this secure data exchange 
and communication, the underlying authentication protocol 
must not only be free from cyber attacks but also ensuring 
privacy. In this paper, we highlight a few drawbacks of 
contemporary smart grid-based authentication schemes, and 
reviewed EI-based V2G scheme by G & S, in particular. G & 
S demonstrated an efficient EI-based V2G authentication 
scheme, however, it bears many security loopholes including 
replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and impersonation 
attack. The scheme is unable to confer session key security to 
the subscriber and also suffers unjustified failures during login 
attempts. Considering the said limitations, we propose a novel 
and efficient V2G protocol framework enabling the vehicles to 
communicate or recharge at desired recharging stations.  
Besides, the results of the proposed framework are evaluated 
and compared against several contemporary schemes and the 
security properties are validated under rigorous formal 
analysis employing random oracle model.  
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